Calcutta Killings August 1946 – Bengal Files
The Kolkata Killings (The Great Calcutta Killings) of August 1946 are regarded as one of the most severe communal riots in the Indian subcontinent. The Hindu Mahasabha had been preparing for this riot well in advance. The Kolkata massacre of August 1946 aided their long-cherished goal of partitioning Bengal in August 1947. In fact, they were the primary cause behind this riot. For several years, across the city, suburbs, villages, and towns, they had been carrying out propaganda and provocation against the Muslim community and in favor of the partition of Bengal.
The unrest began early in the morning of August 16, 1946, through looting of shops and bloodshed by some miscreants. However, this riot eventually escalated into violent clashes between Muslims and Hindus, lasting for five days until August 20.
At least four to five thousand people were killed in this riot. After the situation was brought under control, it was revealed that thousands of people from both sides had been brutally slain. Ten days after the killings began, over three thousand corpses lay strewn across the pavements of this “city of dreadful night.” The number of dead bodies far exceeded the capacity of the city’s cremation facilities. As a result, the government had to gather Doms (low-caste mortuary workers) to collect and pile the corpses into mass graves.
Embed from Getty Images(The communal riots of August 16 were not limited to Kolkata alone. They also spread to neighboring industrial areas including Howrah, Hooghly, 24 Parganas, and Asansol, where many people lost their lives, whose counts have not even been factored in here.)
Prime Minister Suhrawardy also spent a considerable amount of time at the police control room during that period, as he concurrently held the charge of the Home Minister. It was alleged that Suhrawardy was interfering with police operations from the control room, preventing the police from acting independently to quell the riots.
Kolkata Police Commissioner D.R. Hardwick testified before the Commission of Inquiry: “…I had very little time to study the situation, as the Prime Minister was present and would immediately engage in discussions with me about why I was unable to rescue people or deploy pickets—these two main issues led to frequent arguments. Additionally, other Muslim League officials or parliamentary secretaries always accompanied the Prime Minister, creating a disturbance in the control room as they often argued among themselves…. This is why I asked the Prime Minister to remove his friends. I ordered most of the people out, but I could not order the Prime Minister to leave because I had no authority to do so.” It is noteworthy here that the Police Commissioner never stated even once that the Prime Minister was interfering in his work or preventing him from functioning independently. He referred to arguments, which was quite natural in that situation; the Prime Minister repeatedly urged for the deployment of the military and had already granted permission to call in the army by 2:45 PM, but the British military commanders were strongly opposed to deploying troops.
A detailed note written by P.D. Martin, Additional Secretary of the Home Department, provides insight into the actual situation. Martin had already served for the past ten years in positions such as Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary, and Additional Secretary in charge of police administration, military communications, and the organization of civil defense services. In other words, he was an expert on internal security. Starting from August 16, for four consecutive days, this senior official spent most of his time in the Kolkata Police Control Room, consulting with the Chief Secretary, top military and police officials, and District Magistrates to make a series of crucial decisions to tackle the horrific riots. In his detailed note, spanning nearly 20 pages, Martin mentioned Suhrawardy on only four or five minor occasions—the one exception being when Suhrawardy confronted the British Chief Secretary and insisted on summoning the army at midnight of the 16th/17th.
Martin made no mention of any interference by the Prime Minister in police operations in his note. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman stated in his Unfinished Memoirs that out of the fourteen to fifteen hundred police personnel in Kolkata at the time, only fifty to sixty were Muslim. The composition among officers was similarly skewed. Therefore, the allegation that Suhrawardy was interfering in police work is a completely false rumor.
Many historians and critics lay the entire blame for the massacre on Prime Minister Suhrawardy. However, the Prime Minister of Bengal at the time was a Prime Minister in name only; actual power—including the police and the military—was entirely controlled by British officers. How hesitant the British police and military commanders were on that day can be inferred from the table below.
Police Control Room
16 August
- 7:00 AM: The first report of clashes arrives.
- 8:00 AM: As per the “Emergency Action Plan” introduced in early 1946, police forces are withdrawn from the streets.
- 2:30 PM: Police Commissioner Hardwick decides to request military assistance.
- 2:40 PM: Governor Burrows approves military deployment.
- 2:45 PM: Prime Minister Suhrawardy consents to the deployment of troops.
- 3:00 PM: Burrows, Hardwick, and Area Commander Sixsmith tour the city to assess the situation.
- 4:15 PM: Burrows and others decide that the situation does not justify military intervention and that troops should be brought to Sealdah Camp as a precautionary measure.
- 5:30 PM: Suhrawardy meets Sixsmith, demanding military pickets be set up in the city. Sixsmith refuses.
- 7:00 PM: A senior Indian police officer is sent to evaluate the situation and determine whether military action should be taken. Hardwick is informed that the army should be called in. However, Fort Commander McKinley intervenes and tells Hardwick that he prefers not to deploy the military immediately.
- 9:00 PM: Curfew is imposed.
- 10:30 PM: Chief Secretary Walker prepares to leave the police control room, but Suhrawardy protests. A serious reassessment of the situation begins.
- 11:30 PM: Suhrawardy, Walker, McKinley, and Hardwick agree that the military will “patrol” North Kolkata.
17 August
- 1:45 AM: The first military “patrol” is dispatched from Sealdah Camp with explicit orders not to open fire on crowds.
- 11:00 AM: Burrows, Walker, Sixsmith, McKinley, and Hardwick set out on a second tour to review the situation. They find the situation in North Kolkata so severe that they abort their inspection midway, hurry back, and order troops to “dominate” the area.
- 3:30 PM: Three British battalions enter the worst-affected sectors of North Kolkata.
- 5:30 PM: The military gains control of the area; riots spread to other regions.
18 August
- 2:00 AM: Troops are dispatched to the dock areas. Later in the morning, Army Commander Bucher arrives from Ranchi.
- 10:00 AM: Troops are dispatched to Barrackpore and Naihati.
- 11:30 AM: In a meeting among Bucher, Indian cabinet ministers, and high-ranking British officials, it is decided that military pickets will be established at strategic locations across Kolkata.
- 12:00 PM (Noon): Bucher, Burrows, Suhrawardy, and Walker begin a third inspection tour and find the situation still out of control.
- 4:30 PM: A British reserve battalion equipped with fifteen to twenty tanks enters Upper Chitpur Road.
In summary, it took British officials at least twenty-one hours (from 2:30 PM on August 16 to 11:30 AM on August 17) to resolve to take initial effective action. They were completely engulfed in confusion on the first day; full-scale efforts began only after the arrival of Army Commander Bucher on the morning of August 18.
Context of the August Killings
From the beginning of British rule, Hindus had maintained their dominance in government jobs and across all administrative departments. However, following the announcement of the Communal Award by the British government, a competition for control over local institutions ensued. Emerging Muslim groups began continuously challenging the dominance of the Hindu Bhadralok (gentrifiers/elite class). In the Muslim-majority areas of East Bengal, Muslim representation in local and district boards increased steadily. Even in the western districts, where Hindus were in the majority, Muslim influence in local self-governing institutions grew significantly.
The Hindu Bhadralok, who had traditionally held power in local bodies—such as union, local, and district boards, as well as municipalities—became deeply aggrieved upon losing control over these institutions. In many instances, this resulted in communal friction, which often escalated into violent clashes. A similar trend was observed in school boards, which had historically been monopolized by the Bhadralok. Even in Dhaka, their traditional stronghold, Hindus failed to prevent the control of municipalities and schools from slipping out of their hands. Losing control over educational institutions was particularly unbearable for the Hindu Bhadralok, as they regarded themselves as the custodians of Bengal’s intellectual and cultural heritage.
The Hindu Bhadralok in Hindu-majority districts had hoped to compensate for the power they lost at the provincial level by asserting a greater role at the local level. However, this proved to be impossible. Instead, they found themselves losing ground to Muslims across all fronts, even in the Hindu-majority districts.
Provocation by the Hindu Mahasabha
With the objective of changing this state of affairs and increasing Hindu numbers in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, the Hindu Mahasabha issued promotional pamphlets in 1931 urging tribal communities to adopt upper-caste Hindu names and register themselves as “Kshatriyas” in the upcoming census. At a public meeting in Munger, Savarkar formally inducted five Santhal boys into the Hindu fold.
In certain areas, activities of this nature produced distinct political repercussions. In the Malda district of North Bengal, Muslim jotedars (landlords) were particularly powerful. Hindu Mahasabha workers attempted to instigate indigenous laborers and sharecroppers not to work on Muslim-owned land. Due to their efforts, “Santhals, Rajbanshis, Turis, and other people of similar classes” refrained from working under Muslims.
During this period, numerous Hindu organizations emerged, all sharing the objective of uniting Hindu society. In January 1939, the Bangiya Hindu Sanghati (Bengal Hindu Solidarity) was established, with the aim of “protecting the rights, legal interests, and privileges of Bengal’s Hindus and fostering solidarity among all sections of the Hindu community.” In March of that year, members of this organization stated in Kolkata that “tribal populations needed to be identified as Hindus” and appealed to the province’s Hindu landlords to join their cause. Many lower-caste organizations responded enthusiastically to such proposals. They were eager to be accepted simply as members of the Hindu community and to gain recognition for their social aspirations.
All of this was essentially part of a larger plan to increase Hindu numerical strength and secure a Hindu majority in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. The 1941 census and the enthusiasm of caste Hindus coincided with the conversion of lower-caste Hindus.
In general, lower-caste Hindus—especially those who had already been demanding recognition of a purer, scriptural status—gratefully accepted the proposed “Hindu” identity. Regrettably for Bengalis, a movement to eliminate the caste system and establish equal social status and rights among Hindus never truly developed here. Those who were considered Jalachal (castes from whom upper castes would not accept water) campaigned to become Jalachal (acceptable); those who were Jalachal campaigned to become Kshatriyas; and those who were Kshatriyas campaigned to become Brahmins. Therefore, this Shuddhi (purification/conversion) strategy of the Hindu Mahasabha proved suitable for Bengal.
Historically, we find no significant record of conflict between tribal populations and Muslims. However, as efforts to recruit tribal groups into Hindu politics intensified in the early 1940s, numerous instances of attacks and counter-attacks occurred between tribal people and Muslims. In early 1941, “tensions arose locally in Rajshahi when a Saraswati Puja procession accompanied by music passed in front of a mosque.” The spring festival of Saraswati Puja was traditionally celebrated by Bengali Hindu Bhadraloks. However, on this occasion, “the participation of nearly two thousand tribals carrying bows, arrows, or wooden staves (lathis) in the Saraswati Puja procession created heightened tension.” This level of tribal participation indicated that the Bhadralok Hindus had succeeded in imposing Hindu “culture” upon the indigenous groups at will and were using them in communal disputes.
Two months later, a major clash was narrowly averted at Narashinghabad near Burnpur. Members of the Gowala (milkman) community began obstructing Muslims from transporting beef from Asansol to the Burnpur beef market—an activity they had carried out for a long time without any objection.
In January 1945, apprehension of unrest arose between Muslims and tribal groups in the Lalbagh area of Dinajpur district when a procession led by Santhals on the occasion of Kali Puja passed by a local mosque during prayer times. That same year, in the Mithapur market under the Lohagara police station in Jessore, Namasudras and Muslims came face-to-face in a severe clash.
On a market day, a group of Namasudras was singing and dancing while carrying an idol past a mosque during prayer time. The Muslims inside the mosque asked them to leave, and they complied. The following day, nearly four thousand Namasudras arrived armed with shields and spears (sarki), dancing and singing again in front of the mosque. They departed without hindrance as the Muslims were unprepared. Following this incident, local Muslims mobilized coreligionists from neighboring villages, preparing to launch a collective attack should the Namasudras return.
In Hindu-majority areas where Hindu dominance was steadily eroding, these conflicts became particularly pronounced. In February 1935, Muslims in the town of Deyara under the Kalna subdivision observed the Eid festival by sacrificing a cow. Cow sacrifice had never taken place in Deyara before. This incident incensed the Hindus of Kalna, who viewed it as a provocative act by the Muslim community. Hindus in the town of Burdwan retaliated by forcibly preventing Muslims from performing cow sacrifices, even though the Muslims of Burdwan had traditionally sacrificed cows during Bakrid every year. Although a violent clash was averted following this event, underlying resentment persisted between the two communities.
The following year, during the immersion ceremony of Durga Puja idols, riots broke out in Burdwan town over the playing of music in front of a mosque. At 8:40 PM, a procession carrying flutes and drums arrived in front of the mosque in the Barabazar area. Muslims were praying inside the mosque at the time. Angered by the noise, both sides engaged in a clash. News of the incident reached the Berikhana mosque quickly, from where a group of Muslims rushed out with staves to block the procession from proceeding with the idol. Heated arguments ensued—the Muslims asserted firmly that music could never be played in front of the mosque. Infuriated, the Hindu processionists abandoned the idol by the roadside and left the spot. The local magistrate intervened in the matter. The Muslims eventually agreed after 10:00 PM to allow music in front of the mosque, after which the processionists finally passed through the route late at night.
Similar incidents occurred in other Hindu-majority districts. In 1934, a major dispute broke out at Mollarchak under the Kakdwip police station in the 24 Parganas district. Like Burdwan, 24 Parganas was more urbanized than other districts and was home to a large population of educated Hindus. However, the influence of educated Hindus over local politics was loosening with each passing year. Even compared to Burdwan, the number of Muslim members in local boards in 24 Parganas grew rapidly. In the Bashirhat and Barasat subdivisions, the proportion of Muslim members far exceeded their population ratio. By 1932, Muslims achieved parity with Hindu members on the Barasat board, despite it being a Hindu-majority area.
In 1933, a major altercation occurred in Behala, North Kolkata. During Eid, “a group of Muslims was taking animals toward Shapoor for sacrifice when a group of Hindus and Sikhs launched a pre-planned attack on them.” The resulting brawl between the two sides left numerous people severely injured.
In 1934, a riot occurred at Mollarchak near the Kakdwip police station in the Diamond Harbour subdivision. Here, “Muslims announced their intention to perform cow sacrifice, while the majority Hindus remained firm in their resolve to stop it.” No prior communal tension had been recorded in the area. The intention to perform cow sacrifice angered the Hindus, who viewed it as an unprecedented act that profaned a Hindu-majority area. A similar incident occurred in 1935 in the neighboring district of Midnapore. A dispute spread from a minor incident at the Barhola police station in Kharagpur because new initiatives by Muslims to perform cow sacrifice “severely offended Hindu sentiments.” Like Burdwan and 24 Parganas, Midnapore was a Hindu-majority district and a primary bastion of Bhadralok politics.
The 1946 elections returned the Muslim League to power in Bengal once again. In April 1946, Suhrawardy formed the government and became the new Prime Minister of Bengal. During the winter of 1945–46, it became clear that the British had no alternative but to grant independence to India.
At that time in Delhi, the Congress was attempting to form an interim government while bypassing the Muslim League. Suhrawardy cautioned the Congress that the potential consequence of strategically sidestepping the League to install the Congress in power would be a declaration of full independence for Bengal. He threatened to declare complete independence for Bengal.
However, to the Hindu Mahasabha, a declaration of full independence for Bengal meant remaining permanently subject to the will of the Muslim majority.
Preparations for the Massacre
It was against this backdrop that the infamous Great Calcutta Killing took place. The Kolkata massacre was not a sudden, spontaneous event. The alarming number of casualties and the unprecedented intensity of the violence make one thing abundantly clear: this riot was pre-planned, and certain groups had made preparations for the riot and genocide. Hindus were prepared beforehand to prevent the whole of Bengal from falling under majority Muslim rule. Far more Muslims were killed than Hindus in that conflict. Patel evaluated this gruesome episode by stating: “Hindus have gained comparatively more from this.”
In support of the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan, August 16, 1946, was designated as “Direct Action Day.” A nationwide general strike (hartal) was called across India. In Bengal, the Muslim League made every effort to ensure the success of the strike. In response, the Hindu Mahasabha and its allied parties were unitedly determined to foil the strike at any cost. Tensions flared early on the morning of August 16 when League volunteers forced Hindu traders in North Kolkata to close their shops, and Hindus retaliated appropriately by setting up roadblocks along the paths of the League’s processions. The League’s rally at the Ochterlony Monument that day was the largest gathering of Muslims seen up to that time. To make this “Day” a success, the League had readied all its frontline organizations. On the other hand, Marwari traders had purchased and stockpiled arms and ammunition from American soldiers, which were later utilized during the riots. Acid bombs were manufactured and stored in Hindu-owned factories long before the outbreak of the riots. Companies owned by Kolkata’s iron merchants—such as the Jaiswals and Guptas—generously supplied iron, and Kolkata’s Hindu blacksmiths were kept ready to forge spears, swords, and other weapons.
The Role of Political Parties
Anticipating political clashes on Direct Action Day, the two nationalist parties—the Muslim League and the Congress (under the cover of the Hindu Mahasabha)—conducted extensive campaigns and propaganda. Explicit propaganda was published in newspapers, inflammatory leaflets were printed, numerous small local meetings were held, and several mass rallies were organized in the heart of the city. A novel feature of such political campaigning in the 1940s was the organization of paramilitary groups under the banner of “volunteers” led by nationalist politicians.
During World War II and the immediate post-war period, one of the defining features of political parties was the extraordinary growth of all kinds of “volunteer” organizations. Originally, the term “volunteer” referred to political party workers who, in principle without remuneration, provided logistical support for political rallies and conferences, social work, relief efforts for famine or flood victims, general vigilance, and similar tasks. In the early 1920s, they became a staple element of political party organization, and by the late 1930s, a segment of them had evolved into paramilitary forces. Operating under names such as the All-India Muslim National Guards, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Khaksars, Congress Volunteer Corps, Hindustan National Guards, and Azad Hind Volunteer Corps, these “volunteer” organizations typically provided their members with informal uniforms resembling military attire, conducted drills regularly with or without weapons (usually staves or lathis), organized paramilitary parades to display their strength and discipline, and established youth training camps.
Criminal elements and thugs (goondas) were also present among these paramilitary volunteers. These criminals were utilized as instruments to translate political party propaganda into real-world action and enforce it on the ground. In the Kolkata massacre, these thugs were directly involved under the guise of volunteers. According to an interview given by Surendra Mohan Ghosh, President of the Bengal Provincial Congress and a senior leader of the secret revolutionary organization Jugantar, a disciplined group of party “volunteers” was already present in every neighborhood of Kolkata when the riots broke out. The city was divided into “36 or 37 blocks,” and Ghosh boasted of being acquainted with the thugs in all these areas. He claimed that those thugs knew how to handle knives and bombs. The Hindu Mahasabha similarly maintained a network of Mahasabha volunteers and Hindustan National Guard commanders across the city.
The presence of “volunteer” organizations was evident right from the morning of the first day of the riots (August 16). For instance, in Taltala in Central Kolkata, around 7:00 AM, loudspeakers and “various groups of Muslim volunteers in different vehicles” were seen. It was likely this very group that played the main role between 9:00 AM and noon in violent clashes with Hindu youths on Surendranath Banerjee Road and in the widespread looting of jewelry shops. Dressed in khaki, they were shouting slogans from lorries. Meanwhile, the Congress instructed its “volunteers” to “organize themselves for resistance,” resulting in clashes breaking out between both sides.
However, from the night of August 16/17, the primary “volunteers” of political parties virtually disappeared from the streets of Kolkata. Participants from the Bengali middle class, including students, retreated from the streets by the evening of the first day. Thereafter, the killings on both sides were carried out by the thugs (goondas) of their respective communities.
Initially, no political party leader realized what a terrifying situation these volunteer thugs—created by their own hands—were about to spawn. However, it did not take long for them to realize that they had opened a Pandora’s box. For example, Congress leader Surendra Mohan Ghosh was monitoring crowd movements with great confidence on the morning of August 16, but by midday, he arrived at the conclusion that the situation was so dire that the whole of Kolkata would burst into flames in an instant. Consequently, he telephoned top Muslim League leaders Khawaja Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy to seek their cooperation in preventing further violence. Suhrawardy rushed to a troubled spot alongside leaders of the Congress and the Communist Party of India (CPI); but by then, it was too late. An enraged mob pelted them with stones, forcing the three leaders to beat a hasty retreat. This ignominious chapter continued with a second attempt by representatives of the three parties to appease the violent mob on the morning of August 17, during which Kiran Sankar Roy of the Congress, Shamsuddin Ahmed of the Muslim League, and Mohammad Ismail of the CPI addressed a mob near European Asylum Lane in Central Kolkata. However, their combined efforts were completely ignored and had no impact on the unfolding events.
According to the Intelligence Branch of the Bengal Police, the vast crowd at the Muslim League’s rally organized at the Maidan on August 16 contained a large number of Muslim thugs (goondas). After the meeting concluded, they dispersed from the venue and looted and set fire to Hindu shops and houses in the North Chowringhee, Dharmatala, Wellesley, and Corporation Street areas—including K.C. Biswas’s gun shop in Chowringhee. Thus began the wave of criminal violence in Central Kolkata that day; from then on, they were seen engaging in all forms of violence on the streets, including brawls, looting, arson, and murder.
Habibur Rahman, alias Habu Goonda
Habibur Rahman—alias Habu, Habu Goonda, or Sheikh Habu—was perhaps the most well-known among the major gang leaders active at the time. A British police officer described him as follows: “First, we spot him among the leaders of a well-organized procession that directly tried to march through Cornwallis Street on Direct Action Day: around this time [approximately 2:00 PM], we observed a large Muslim procession coming from the north along Cornwallis Street near the Shyambazar tram depot. The procession was led by a large military-type lorry, accompanied by a band, laden with people carrying Muslim flags, all chanting slogans. They advanced toward us when I [a senior British sergeant] noticed that some people in the lorry held unsheathed swords and others carried staves (lathis). There were about 1,000 people in the procession, including those in the lorry and on foot… As they moved forward and reached near the Town School, they became extremely disorderly. I saw them running onto the footpaths, and then I noticed a Hindu mob emerging from a side street and brickbats being hurled. The lorry suddenly reversed, and the Muslim crowd retreated along with it, as did the Hindus… I noted that lorry number CH584 was being driven by S. Habu of Lalbagan Bustee. He was known at this police station as a bad character.”
However, Habibur Rahman met a gruesome death on the streets within a few days: so many people died that day that leading tanks crossing the Grey Street–Chitpur Road junction had to halt so soldiers could move some corpses aside to clear a path for vehicular traffic… The following day, over a hundred and fifty bodies were removed from that street corner, and it was right here that one of Kolkata’s primary gang leaders, Habibur Rahman, died fighting with knives in both hands. Habibur was surrounded. Single-handedly, he fought against the Hindus and killed several before being overwhelmed. Habibur’s head was severed from his body, and his corpse was subsequently hung from a tree with a sign attached reading, “Habib has got his Pakistan.”
Habibur Rahman was known as the “terror” of the bustee (slum). At the same time, he was a “prominent local figure.” He was a successful small business owner, possessing not only lorries but also a taxi and a private car. He was involved in illegal petrol smuggling and was also an active Muslim League worker. Although Habibur Rahman was a heavy drinker and a brawler, he was not merely a thug; he was likely educated and was considered the author of a leaflet titled Muslim League Direct Action Plan.
The tragic and violent death of an influential figure like Habibur Rahman right in the middle of the street makes one thing clear: there was no coordinated, organized effort or planning among the Muslim thugs to instigate the riots.
The Notorious Gopal Pantha
In comparison, the Hindus were far more organized and had prepared in advance for a potential riot. As a result of relentless propaganda by the Hindu Mahasabha, a deep-seated fear or panic had taken root in the minds of Hindu Bengalis that if Pakistan were created, the plight of Hindus would be dire; hence, Pakistan had to be prevented at any cost.
In 1946, Gopal Pantha, the infamous thug of North Kolkata, was thirty-three years old. Everyone called him “Pantha,” meaning goat, because he ran a meat shop on College Street. Although he led a gang of neighborhood miscreants, Gopal did not belong to the city’s criminal lower class. His upper-caste Brahmin family (his hereditary surname was Mukherjee) was associated with the Congress Party and had participated in the armed nationalist movement of the 1930s. On the morning of August 16, 1946, he went to his shop as usual, but returned to his neighborhood upon receiving news of the unrest.
In an interview given to the BBC, Gopal Pantha recounted the events of that day:
“Muslim League volunteers were marching with staves (lathis) in hand. From the Babubazar intersection up to Harrison Road, their slogans could be heard—Larke Lenge Pakistan (‘We will fight and take Pakistan’). Then I heard that two gowalas (milkmen) had been murdered in Beliaghata and that rioting had broken out in Babubazar.”
“The country’s situation was very critical then; the nation had to be protected. If we became part of Pakistan, we would be oppressed… So I called all my boys and told them, now is the time to strike back, and ruthlessness must be answered with ruthlessness.”
They equipped themselves with small knives, swords, meat cleavers, staves, and iron rods, while Gopal tucked two American pistols into his waistband. He had purchased these along with some grenades from American soldiers stationed in Kolkata in 1945. “If you paid two hundred and fifty rupees or bought them a bottle of whiskey, the soldiers would give you a .45 caliber pistol and a hundred cartridges.” As news of the rioting spread, his group continued to swell. Hindustani milkmen from the Janbazar area, armed with staves, joined his ranks.
“We fought against those who were attacking us… killed them… If I heard news of one murder, we committed ten… the ratio had to be ten to one, that was my order to my boys.”
Much like Gopal Pantha, Jugal Chandra Ghosh also commanded a contingent of men, and he too belonged to the city’s middle class. He ran a wrestling arena (akhara) in Beliaghata, and his followers launched counter-attacks in Beliaghata and the Miyabagan slum. Jugal Chandra raised funds from the neighborhood sawmills, factories, and cattle sheds (khatals), distributing the money among the attackers: “Ten rupees for a murder, and five rupees for an injury.” He maintained connections with several political leaders in the city—such as Bidhubhushan Sarkar, secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, and Suresh Chandra Banerjee, a trade union leader (INTUC) closely affiliated with the Congress.
Seeing the corpses during the initial days of the riots further fueled Ghosh’s anger toward the Muslim League: “I saw four trucks, all filled with dead bodies, stacked at least three feet high—just like sacks of jaggery… That sight left a profound impression on my mind.”
The picture that emerges from interviews with those who were active during those days also highlights the character of the mobs that rampaged through the alleys and streets of Kolkata. Alongside the city’s upper and middle classes, the mobs often included people who were not native residents of Kolkata—milkmen (gowalas), security guards (darwans), horse-carriage drivers, carters from the coal depots, tailors, boatmen, and small tradesmen—all of whom were “up-countrymen,” migrants who had come to the city for their livelihood.
By the mid-twentieth century, only three-tenths of the city’s population had been born in Kolkata, while the city’s working class hailed primarily from outer districts and other provinces. In 1931, the proportion of people residing in Kolkata who were born in other provinces of India stood at 31.7 percent, whereas those born in other districts of the state made up merely 0.3 percent.
A major portion of these laborers was employed in unskilled work—in jute mills, textile mills, railway workshops, glass and sugar factories, and tanneries. And it was these individuals, both Hindu and Muslim, who were most active in the Kolkata riots both before and after 1946.
Among the Muslim rioters, a significant section comprised butchers, dockworkers (khalasis), masons, and horse-carriage drivers from North and Central Kolkata. Many Muslim factory workers also attended the Direct Action Day rally called by the Muslim League and subsequently engaged in looting and arson. They carried bricks, bombs, petrol-soaked burning cloth, acid bottles, soda-water bottles, and bottles filled with petrol. Slums (bustees) became easy targets.
In the case of Hindu rioters as well, contemporary accounts note a massive presence of “up-countrymen.” Alongside milkmen, sanitation workers, and security guards, local thugs also took part.
Residents from the butchers’ quarters and Kalabagan slum in North Kolkata, as well as Belgachia, Ultadanga, Rajabazar, Entally, Narkeldanga, and Bakulbagan slums, pounced upon one another in groups armed with weapons.
The areas worst affected by the riots included Babubazar, Chittaranjan Avenue, Chitpur Road, Canning Street, Ekbalpur Lane, Khidirpur, Garden Reach, Park Circus, and Watganj.
Sections of the Hindu Mahasabha and Congress, alongside businessmen and wealthy merchants, provided leadership during the riots. Many soldiers of the Indian National Army (INA) who had arrived in the city for INA Day on August 18 also joined the rioting. Even members of the Anglo-Indian minority participated in the conflagration.
Syed Nazimuddin Hashim, who was a student at Presidency College in August 1946, bore witness to the unchecked rioting and massacre in Kolkata:
“The first victim I saw was a poor Oriya laborer… he had no idea what was happening… he had a basket on his head and had turned into a side street… a Muslim wearing a lungi detached himself from the procession and struck him on the head with an iron rod. The man was utterly stunned, his ear burst open from the blow…. All food shops were closed, New Market was closed; uncontrolled rioting and looting went on for three days, in which Anglo-Indians fully participated; a music and radio shop was looted using a pickup truck; departmental stores in Wellington Square and Chowringhee Road were looted, as were all liquor shops.”
It was stated in another interview that:
“Anglo-Indian sergeants and Pathan soldiers raided the aforementioned houses (4, Jugipara By-Lane and 232, 234A A and B Vivekananda Road) at 2:30 PM. Not only the male members, but even the women of the houses were assaulted and tortured.”
Here is the English translation of the excerpt from Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Unfinished Memoirs regarding his personal experiences during the August 1946 Direct Action Day in Kolkata:
“Jinnah Sahib declared August 16 as ‘Direct Action Day.’ Through statements, he called for this day to be observed peacefully. He wanted to show the British Government and the Cabinet Mission that the ten crore (100 million) Muslims of India were resolute in achieving their demand for Pakistan and would accept no obstacles. However, leaders of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha began issuing statements claiming that this ‘Direct Action Day’ had been declared against them.
We were called upon again to ensure the day was observed properly. Hashim Sahib [Abul Hashim] held a meeting with us and said, ‘You must go from neighborhood to neighborhood, including Hindu neighborhoods. You will tell them: this struggle of ours is not against Hindus; it is against the British; come, let us observe this day together regardless of race or religion.’ We set out in cars fitted with megaphones and began propaganda equally in Hindu and Muslim neighborhoods. The message was clear: ‘Pakistan’ is our demand, and this demand is not against Hindus, but against the British. Hearing our speeches and statements, some leaders of the Forward Bloc came to the Muslim League office and proposed that Hindus and Muslims observe the day peacefully together. We agreed. But they could not stand against the propaganda of the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress, which convinced the Hindu community that this was directed against them.
Suhrawardy Sahib was then the Prime Minister of Bengal. He too instructed, ‘Observe this day peacefully. Any trouble will bring disrepute to the Muslim League government.’ He declared August 16 a public holiday, which infuriated the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha even further.
On August 15, assignments were finalized regarding who would be stationed where. On August 16, a public meeting was scheduled at the Kolkata Maidan (Garer Math), with processions arriving from all areas. Muslim students of Kolkata were to assemble at Islamia College at 10:00 AM. I was tasked with staying at Islamia College, though at 7:00 AM we were to go to Calcutta University to hoist the Muslim League flag. Nuruddin and I arrived at the university on bicycles and hoisted the flag. No one obstructed us, though I later heard that after we left, the flag was taken down and torn. We returned to Islamia College via College Street and Bowbazar, opening the college doors and halls. Had we been even half an hour later returning via Bowbazar, no one would have ever found the bodies of Nuruddin and me. We could sense the atmosphere turning sour as we returned. Nuruddin left me at the college and headed to the League office, promising to return soon.
Only a few workers had arrived from Baker Hostel. I asked them to open the meeting hall and arrange the tables and chairs. A few Muslim female students had also arrived at Islamia College from Suhrawardy’s Manujan Hostel; all of them were activists of the Muslim Students League. Among them, I remember the names of Hajera Begum (now Hajera Mahmud Ali), Halima Khatun (now Nuruddin Sahib’s wife), Zainab Begum (now Mrs. Jalil), and Sadeqa Begum (now Sadeqa Samad). Within minutes of their arrival, several male students reached Islamia College bleeding and barely able to run—some stabbed in the back, others with cracked skulls. I was completely at a loss as to what to do, as we were not prepared for this at all. The female students stepped forward and said, ‘Send the injured to us and arrange for water.’ Where would they find bandages? They began tearing their scarves (odhnas) and cutting their sarees to make bandages. I quickly sent word to the nearby hostel. After bandaging them, we started sending them to the house of a doctor we knew.
One student mentioned that Hindus were not attacking if people moved in groups, but were striking whenever they caught individuals alone. Further news arrived that students who went to hoist the flag at Ripon College had been attacked.
Near Islamia College was Suren Banerjee Road, followed by the junction of Dharmatala and Wellington Square—an area inhabited almost entirely by Hindus. News reached us that the mosque at Wellington Square had been attacked, and a Hindu crowd was advancing toward Islamia College. Leaving a few students behind with the female activists, forty to fifty of us marched almost empty-handed toward the Dharmatala intersection. I had little concept of what a communal riot actually entailed. I saw hundreds of people from the Hindu community attacking the mosque. The Maulvi was fleeing toward us, pursued by a group of men armed with staves (lathis) and swords. Nearby were a few Muslim-owned shops; some men joined us holding staves. A few among us began shouting ‘Pakistan Zindabad.’ In no time, a crowd gathered. The Hindus were right in front of us, and there was no choice but to resist. People fought back using bricks or whatever they could lay their hands on. In total, we were no more than a hundred and fifty people. Someone from behind handed us a few staves for self-defense; prior to that, the clash was fought entirely with bricks. Meanwhile, a large procession arrived—they had faced resistance in several places but could not be stopped. All of them carried staves and joined us. Within minutes, the Hindus retreated, and we fell back as well. Police arrived several times, fired tear gas, and left to patrol. By then, hand-to-hand fighting had broken out across Kolkata. I can confidently say that Muslims were not prepared for riots at all.
We set off toward the Maidan. We were already late. Lakhs (hundreds of thousands) of people were present at the rally. Processions had been attacked in Kalighat, Bhowanipore, Harrison Road, and Burrabazar. Shaheed Sahib [Suhrawardy] delivered his speech and ordered everyone to return home quickly. But where could those whose homes or neighborhoods lay within Hindu areas go? The Muslim League office was overcrowded, as was the Kolkata City Muslim League office. Many people fled to Zakaria Street. Wellesley, Park Circus, and Beniapukur could be considered Muslim areas. Many injured people arrived and had to be sent to Medical College, Campbell Hospital, and the Islamic Hospital. Telephones rang every minute with the same desperate plea: ‘Save us, we are trapped! Our families will be wiped out tonight.’ A few people sat near the phones just to record names and addresses. The League office turned into a refugee camp, and Islamia College was opened up as well. When I went to open the Calcutta Madrasa, the gatekeeper refused to open it. I ran to the Principal Sahib, who came personally and ordered the gates opened. People from nearby areas kept bringing news. Baker Hostel and Elliott Hostel were already full. Now the concern was how to save the boys at Taylor Hostel. We could procure no resources. Some students had arrived by afternoon, while others were trapped. The building had only a single gate, surrounded by Hindu houses; if set on fire, the entire Hindu neighborhood would be destroyed. Mobs tried to break the gate several times at night but failed. I could not reach Suhrawardy Sahib; whenever I called, I was told he was at Lalbazar, the police headquarters. Late at night, Nuruddin managed to secure a large vehicle and some police personnel to rescue them. Many Hindus resided in Taltala and Wellesley areas; some secretly sought our help. With great difficulty and at personal risk, we managed to escort a few families to Hindu areas. A few Hindu families living near Baker Hostel were also protected; they just needed to be safely escorted to Suren Banerjee Road.
I was deeply worried myself, as five of our six brothers and sisters were in Kolkata and Serampore at the time. I was not worried about my second sister, as she was in Beniapukur, where another sister was visiting. One sister was in Serampore. My only brother, Sheikh Abu Naser, was studying for his Matriculation—a mere boy. He used to stay intermittently at my second sister’s house, my younger sister’s house, and with me, rarely listening to anyone. He was very mischievous as a child. He had certainly gone to the Maidan and had not returned to me. Who knew if he was alive! The situation in Serampore was very grim; in the neighborhood where my sister lived, there were only two Muslim families.
In Kolkata, dead bodies lay scattered across the city. Neighborhood after neighborhood had been burned down—a horrific sight! It was frightening to even think that human beings could slaughter fellow humans like this. I tried to gather news one by one. My younger brother-in-law lived at Tower Lodge on Harrison Road. I went there in a fire brigade vehicle and learned that he had moved to Carmichael Hostel. Naser was neither with my second sister nor with me. When I asked my youngest brother-in-law, Syed Hossain, he said, ‘Naser Bhai came to my place on August 16. I asked him to stay, but he didn’t, and I didn’t push him because my place wasn’t safe either. We have to flee as well.’
There was no further trace of him, and I had no way to get news! Arrangements were made for refugees at Lady Brabourne College—women on the first floor and men below. Duties were divided among workers; I had to stay there periodically. I also had to participate in rescue operations for Muslims. On a couple of occasions, we came under attack while conducting rescues. We also helped rescue Hindus and send them to Hindu neighborhoods. It felt as though humanity had been lost, and people had turned into beasts. On the first day, August 16, Muslims were severely beaten. Over the next two days, Muslims retaliated fiercely against Hindus. This was later evident from hospital records.
Meanwhile, rice and flour ran out in the hostels. No shop opened out of fear of being looted. I went to Shaheed Sahib and asked what could be done. Shaheed Sahib said, ‘I have entrusted Nawabzada Nasrullah [younger brother of Nawab Habibullah of Dhaka, a very courteous man and Deputy Chief Whip loyal to Shaheed Sahib]; go see him.’ We rushed to him. He took us to St. Xavier’s College and said, ‘Rice is stored here; make arrangements to carry it. We have no vehicles, as the military has taken almost all of them. However, if you wait, vehicles can be arranged later.’ We brought handcarts, but who would push them? Myself, Nuruddin, and Nurul Huda (now an engineer at DIT) loaded rice onto the handcart and began pushing it. Nuruddin Sahib was frail, with no physical strength at all. The three of us pushed the handcart to deliver rice to Baker Hostel and Elliott Hostel. But how were we to reach Carmichael Hostel? It was far away and required crossing Hindu neighborhoods—reaching there on a handcart was entirely impossible. Nuruddin managed to secure a fire brigade vehicle, and the three of us delivered some rice to Carmichael Hostel and returned.
I heard there was no trouble in Serampore, but where was Naser? I sent someone to Serampore for news. The rioting and looting had abated slightly. Naser had arrived in Kolkata on August 16 and got trapped on Harrison Road. He then saved his life by boarding an ambulance. Naser’s leg had been crippled by typhoid in childhood, causing him to walk with a limp. Showing his leg, he managed to get into the ambulance, stayed inside all day, and in the evening took a train from Howrah to Serampore. The train journey took three hours and was attacked several times, but he somehow survived. One truth remains: many Hindus risked their lives to protect Muslims, and some lost their lives doing so. Similarly, many Muslims gave their lives to protect their Hindu neighbors—I witnessed this myself. Among the phone calls coming into the Muslim League office, many were from Hindus who had given shelter to Muslims in their homes, asking us to pick them up quickly, warning that otherwise both the hosts and the sheltered Muslims would be killed.
I saw a group of people who cared nothing about the riots; they were simply breaking open shops and looting. I got into trouble trying to stop one of them, and he attacked me. A curfew was imposed, and there was no way to go out at night. Anyone stepping out after dusk was beyond saving—no questions asked, shot on sight. The military would shoot people down, even if a window was left open. At dawn, many people could be seen lying dead on the streets, shot down.
Once, Sylhet’s Moazzem Chowdhury (now an MNA of the Convention Muslim League) and I were tasked with guarding a Muslim slum located between Park Circus and Ballygunge at night, as it was attacked by Hindus every evening. They were short on people who could handle firearms. Moazzem and I could shoot, as our fathers owned guns and we knew how to fire.
As evening approached, word came from the Millat office to head to that area. We set off at a run, as there were no vehicles available and we had to travel on foot. Just as we crossed Lower Circular Road and entered a side street, curfew time hit. We walked past the graveyard, hiding whenever we heard a vehicle approach and then resuming our walk. With great difficulty, we reached the back of Park Circus Maidan. How were we to cross the Maidan? After trying for a long time, we skirted around the back of the Maidan to reach the house of Mohammad Nasiruddin, owner and editor of Saogat press. From there, we crossed another street and entered a friend’s house. But what were we to do now? The friend’s parents absolutely refused to let us leave, as military patrols were right at the street corner, shooting at any shadow. There was no choice; we had to spend the night there and failed to reach our destination, though fortunately, no trouble occurred that night. We had covered nearly a mile and a half and could have been shot dead at any moment.
In the Park Circus area, Justice Siddiky, Mr. Abdur Rashid, Mr. Tofazzal Ali (former Minister), and several others led defense parties. We served as volunteers. Camps were established at Sealdah and Howrah stations for Hindus and Muslims so that newcomers would not wander into the wrong neighborhoods, as crossing into each other’s areas meant certain death. Among the women in Kolkata, Suhrawardy Sahib’s daughter Mrs. Sulaiman, Nawabzada Nasrullah’s daughter Iffat Nasrullah, Begum Akhtar Athar Ali, Nurjehan Begum (editor of the weekly Begum magazine), Begum Rashid, Rokeya Kabir, and female students from Manujan Hostel and Lady Brabourne College worked tirelessly. They worked day and night inside the refugee centers for women, while we worked among the men. Despite difficulties at night, I saw Hajera Mahmud Ali, Halima Nuruddin, and several others working through the night.
The situation in Kolkata had become horrific. Muslims had moved into Muslim areas, and Hindus into Hindu areas. The only place left to meet friends was Esplanade, which we called Chowringhee. Then the situation worsened. After several days of calm, minor trouble or stabbings would suddenly erupt in some corner. Shaheed Sahib worked day and night to maintain peace. Out of a police force of fourteen to fifteen hundred in Kolkata, only fifty to sixty were Muslim, and the situation among officers was similar. How could Shaheed Sahib run a League government under such conditions? When he wanted to recruit another thousand Muslims into the police force, the British Governor objected. Only when Shaheed Sahib threatened to resign did the Governor agree. He recruited demobilized soldiers returned from the war in Punjab. This created a massive uproar, with Congress and Hindu Mahasabha newspapers raising the loudest protest.”
Preparation and Organization of Hindu Groups
While the Muslim League is generally blamed for the Kolkata massacre, there is no evidence that the League had any long-term preparation to engineer a riot. The majority of the Muslim rioters were from the floating, transient population that had migrated to the city from rural areas. On the other hand, the Hindu Mahasabha and its affiliate organizations had been preparing for a long time to engage in a showdown with the Muslims. A large number of Bhadralok (educated/elite) Hindus were arrested on rioting charges. Analyzing the composition of the Hindu mob involved in the riots, Suranjan Das notes that Bengali Hindu students and other professional or middle-class individuals were actively involved. Wealthy businessmen, influential merchants, artists, and shopkeepers were arrested. A major portion of the mob that murdered the renowned eye specialist Dr. Jamal Mohammad consisted of “educated youths.” It was hardly surprising that many among them spoke in English with police officers. Even more surprising was that among the Hindus arrested for continuously hurling bombs into Muslim crowds during the lingering unrest after the massacre was a prominent physician from Burdwan, Dr. Mahendranath Sarkar. He admitted: “I am now a Congress leader. Previously, I was a member of the Hindu Mahasabha. I joined this movement in favor of the partition of Bengal.” Discharged soldiers from the Indian National Army (INA) and Marwari merchants also joined on the side of the Hindus. The unexpected unity among students, professionals, businessmen, shopkeepers, and local neighborhood muscle created a bloody victory for the Hindu mob on the streets of Kolkata that day. This Hindu unity was not forged in a single day; preparations had been underway for a long time.
“During the late 1930s and early 1940s, a proliferation of Hindu volunteer organizations was witnessed in Kolkata and mofussil (district) towns. The declared policy of these groups was to unite Hindus; however, they directed most of their energy toward encouraging Bhadralok youths to attain physical fitness and undergo paramilitary training. Perhaps the largest and most well-organized among these was the Bharat Sevashram Sangha. It functioned as the volunteer wing of the Hindu Mahasabha. Although publicly a social service organization, the Sangha adopted military tactics from the outset and called upon Hindus to train in self-defense techniques.
In September 1939, a meeting of the Sangha was held under the chairmanship of Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee. An estimated 2,600 people attended the assembly. Speakers raised the issue of the Communal Award, asserting that its purpose was to curb the power of Bengali Hindus. They argued that, with the help of former convicted revolutionaries Pulin Das and Satin Sen, Hindus should establish akharas (wrestling grounds/gymnasiums) and focus on physical culture so that if Hindus were attacked, a thousand staves (lathis) would be raised in response.
Posters written in Bengali were printed, one of which was titled: ‘Abandon the mindset of non-violence immediately, manhood is what is needed.’ Two months later, at another Sangha meeting, placards displayed in the pavilion read in Bengali: ‘Hindus arise and take a pledge to slay the demons (asuras).’ The following year, the same theme was expressed using religious imagery of Lord Shiva.
On April 7, 1940, a Hindu conference was organized by the Sevashram Sangha at Maheshwari Bhawan. Speeches were delivered to cultivate a martial mindset among Hindus. A large image of Lord Shiva holding a trident (trishula) was displayed. Swami Bijanananda stated that Hindu gods and goddesses were always armed with various weapons to destroy asuras. Swami Adityananda remarked that he had brought a stave to serve Hindus, declaring that the enemies of Hindus must be beheaded. Pointing toward the depiction of Shiva with the trident, he urged his followers to step forward armed at least with staves. Swami Pranavananda envisioned building a defense force of five hundred thousand people and appealed to Marwaris for financial aid. Harnam Das called upon every Hindu to become a soldier. The Sangha’s proposal to raise a defense force of five hundred thousand Hindus was adopted, noting with satisfaction that twelve thousand recruits had already been enlisted.
By the early 1940s, the number of Hindu volunteer groups in Kolkata grew significantly. Among them, another ‘active’ wing of the Mahasabha, the Hindu Shakti Sangha, was quite large and well-structured. It had over five hundred members affiliated with various branches across different parts of the city, and its financial standing was robust. Major volunteer organizations often received substantial financial backing. For instance, the Bharat Sevashram Sangha received support from Marwaris. Babu Parimal Singh of the Susang royal family was a loyal supporter of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). It was claimed that the RSS had nearly one hundred thousand members in Bengal.
Such organizations were highly effective in mobilizing a large section of Kolkata’s Hindu Bhadralok youth into the communal ideology of the 1940s and the politics of the Hindu Mahasabha and Hindu-leaning Congress. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh provided its enlisted youth with ‘physical training,’ which included instruction in handling firearms. Soldiers and military personnel demobilized after the War were enticed to procure firearms and ammunition for Hindu communal organizations. Following the War, the Mahasabha was exceptionally active among demobilized military personnel; they attempted to organize soldiers and ‘discharged Indian National Army personnel under the banner of the Mahasabha’ and arranged military training for Hindu youth led by former army personnel.
In an emotional letter written to Syama Prasad Mookerjee, a former Hindu army officer stationed at Panagarh declared: ‘We, the former Hindu officers of the armed forces in Burdwan district, are anxiously waiting to take revenge against our dangerous enemy, the Muslims, in Hindu-majority districts… We are ready and will follow your orders. We have taken an oath and will not desist from fulfilling our heartfelt desire. We are armed and fully versed in battle tactics… We believe that through this method of retaliation, we can halt the barbarian Muslims of this province, and from this, their half-caste, notorious leaders Suhrawardy and Nazimuddin will realize the courage of Hindus to retaliate.’
Against this backdrop of resisting Muslims at all costs, after contesting the 1945–46 elections, it was hardly surprising that a few months later, Hindu volunteers were ready for a trial of strength in Kolkata.
B.R. Moonje fired the first shot in the Mahasabha’s election campaign by declaring: ‘The Hindu Mahasabha wants independence, but it does not believe it can be achieved through non-violent means. For this reason, it wants to organize attacks along the most modern scientific lines of the West… In facing the threat of civil war (from the Muslim League), it would be wise if the Congress adopted the Mahasabha’s slogan: “Train the youth in horsemanship and rifle shooting.”‘
When civil war became imminent in Bengal, Mahasabha volunteers were ready with bamboo staves, daggers, and country-made pistols to act on their leaders’ advice, eager to plunge into battle like a military force.”
Neighborhood Solidarity
When the unprecedented riots broke out in Kolkata, residents in several places organized unexpected “defense groups.” For example, railway workers living in the Narkeldanga slum formed a “united Hindu volunteer force to prevent outsiders from entering the neighborhood.” In other areas, residents built barricades to protect their respective para (neighborhoods). Barricading was particularly noticeable in the Park Circus area, where Muslim residents used “iron gates and pushcarts to construct barricades around several lanes.” In Ripon Street, west of the mixed-population Park Circus, Muslims built barricades with the help of Anglo-Indians on the evening of August 17 upon receiving news of an “impending attack by Sikhs.”
In North Kolkata, where minority Muslims lived in isolated small pockets, neighborhood solidarity occasionally served as an effective shield to protect them from attacks by Hindu intruders. For instance, on Masjidbari Street, there was a small settlement comprising 6 brick-built (pucca) buildings and huts, home to nearly 100 Muslims. When a Hindu mob attempted to attack this neighborhood on August 16, its Hindu residents stood their ground. The Hindu outsiders were unable to attack the Muslims “because all the Hindus of the area dispersed them.” “Not a single Muslim was killed, as the Hindus protected them.” Following another attempt the next day, prompt police action led to the rescue of the Muslims and their evacuation to a safe location.
An event that occurred on August 16 and 17 in the Dhulipara area of Ram Chand Ghosh Lane off Beadon Street in North Kolkata gives us a glimpse into how a neighborhood community could function under extreme psychological pressure. A small Muslim settlement existed in this locality. At 6:50 PM on August 16, the officer-in-charge of the Burtolla Police Station received a letter from Satyen Nath Bose, a Hindu advocate residing in Dhulipara, which read:
“The Dhulipara area is in grave danger. The Muslim residents of our locality, who are quite innocent and cause no trouble, are being needlessly attacked by pimps, ex-convicts, and ruffians from the Sonagachi and Rambagan areas. These extremists are now being incited by people from the Nootan Bazar area. The plight of nearly 200 people is extremely dire. Whichever of us Hindu neighbors step forward to help them are also being attacked. At times, these miscreants attack in mobs numbering in the hundreds. Their sole intention is to loot the people of the area, nothing else. If police are deployed and patrol here, most of the neighborhood people will assist the police. This is extremely urgent and critical, and I hope you will extend your helping hand immediately. On behalf of the residents of the Dhulipara area, and especially for the innocent Muslims of the locality who have taken temporary shelter in the mosque at 15 Ram Chand Ghosh Lane, I am making this appeal.”
The officer-in-charge rushed to Dhulipara and conducted a “sort of conference with the local people lasting nearly half an hour.” As a result, the Hindu and Muslim residents reached an agreement wherein the Hindus promised to protect their Muslim neighbors at the cost of their own lives, while the Muslims trusted that the Hindus would honor their word. Following this “conference,” the mosque where the Muslims had taken shelter was attacked at least three times. During the second attack at night, “two or three Hindus of that area stood alongside the Muslim defenders, and a few of them were injured.” However, during the third attack, solidarity in Dhulipara collapsed: “when the third attack commenced on the morning of the 17th, many of the local Hindus were seen joining those ruffians to loot the houses of these Muslims and murder them.” Upon arriving in Dhulipara that same evening, the officer-in-charge found 12 to 13 dead bodies inside the mosque.
Conclusion
The responsibility for the August 1946 massacre rests upon all parties—the British Raj, the Muslim League, the Congress, and the Hindu Mahasabha.
In August 1946, the seat of power in the Bengal Government was effectively split into two centers: one led by the Prime Minister of Bengal and the other by the British Governor, who were locked in a continuous tug-of-war. On the critical night of August 16–17, while murder and rampage engulfed the entire city, severe errors of judgment were made in deciding to take mere half-measures, such as military “patrolling.” Why was there such delay and indecision? It is relevant to note an intriguing fact here: in his telegram to London reporting the outbreak of serious riots in Kolkata, the Governor of Bengal, F.J. Burrows, offered the reassurance that “the disturbances which have so far taken place are clearly communal and in no way anti-British or anti-Government.”
In reality, the British Raj was extremely cautious regarding anti-British civil unrest. Just the previous February, during the turmoil demanding the release of Indian National Army prisoners held at the Red Fort, between 3,000 and 4,000 people were killed by British police fire; hence, before leaving India, the British Raj wanted to avoid embroiling itself in fresh troubles. In fact, generals in Eastern Command feared that the communal riots might transform into an anti-British uprising. As Brigadier Sixsmith, who was in charge of the Kolkata area, revealed in notes written years after the unrest: “Although the initial event [on August 16] may have been communal, I thought, and thought, that military action against Indian civilians would intensify anti-British feeling and create a far worse situation for the British.”
The Muslim League was in power; it had called for Direct Action Day, and its followers initiated the preliminary unrest, yet the leadership was completely blind to its potential consequences. This was undoubtedly a manifestation of extreme incompetence on the part of the Muslim League leaders and ministers.
The Hindu Mahasabha, on the other hand, had been preparing for this riot long in advance. In fact, they were the primary catalyst for this violence. For several years, they had been conducting propaganda and incitement against the Muslim community across the city, suburbs, towns, and villages in favor of the partition of Bengal. Ultimately, the Kolkata massacre of August 1946 aided in realizing their long-sought goal—the partition of Bengal in August 1947.
References:
The Role of Colonial Administration, ‘Riot Systems’ and Local Networks during the Calcutta Disturbances of August 1946 By Nariaki Nakazato
A City Feeding on Itself: Riots, Testimonies and Literatures of the 1940s in Calcutta By Debjani Sengupta
Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, JOYA CHATTERJI
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